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Abstract: 
This article considers the state of the doctrine on dual attribution in military operations. The 
rapidly expanding jurisprudence on cooperative military ventures has yet to coalesce around a 
single normative framework. The role of the DARIO and DARSIWA in that realm has been 
decidedly mixed, perhaps predictably given the inconsistency between the two codes. The most 
hopeful developments have come in the Netherlands, with the elaboration of a bifocal, 
preventive interpretation of DARIO article 7. However, whether that framework will resonate 
elsewhere is uncertain. Thus far, the concept of dual attribution itself has played an odd role. It 
has been affirmed repeatedly in theory, but the primary value of its theoretical possibility has 
been in empowering courts to hear cases they might otherwise have avoided, while failing 
actually to attribute conduct to two or more entities. 
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A. Introduction 
The vision of article 43 of the United Nations (UN) Charter notwithstanding, international 
security is viewed by contemporary international law as a field in which states act as unitary 
actors, exercising self-help, and coordinating only loosely through military alliances. This is an 
anachronism. Faced with threats that defy the state system, transcend borders, and, in extreme 
cases, trigger humanitarian imperatives to act, states have turned increasingly to institutionally 
and operationally thick cooperative military enterprises (CMEs) to further their security 
objectives. 
These ventures are diverse in form and objective. They include ad hoc coalitions,1 
international-organization-led military deployments,2 peacekeeping operations,3 multinational 
occupation forces (authorized or unauthorized),4 and merged military operations deployed 
alongside international administrative missions.5  
The rise of thick multilateralism should be welcomed. In the face of severe transnational 
challenges, robust international security cooperation is vital to pursuing peace, security, and 
human rights.6 Indeed, in the absence of centralized enforcement, cooperation is vital to the very 
rule of international law.7 However, in a legal regime premised on independent state 
responsibility, cooperation poses a doctrinal challenge when these ventures go off the rails. Put 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example: Steve Schifferes, ‘US Names Coalition of the Willing,’ BBC News (18 March 2003). 
2 Consider: UN forces (S.C. Res 2098 (S/RES/2098) 28 March, 2013), UN-authorized NATO forces (S.C. Res. 1386 
(S/RES/2098) 20 December 2001), other NATO forces (UK Ministry of Defence, Press Release: ‘International 
partners sign Joint Expeditionary Force Agreement,’ 5 September 2014), and EU forces (Aurel Sari and Ramses A. 
Wessel, ‘International Responsibility for EU Military Operations’ in Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, and Jan 
Wouters (eds.) The EU's Role in Global Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) pp. 126-144). 
3 Various regional international organizations have joined the UN in performing this role. S.C. Res 1671, 
(S/RES/1671), 25 April, 2006; S.C. Res 2085, (S/RES/2085) 20 December 2012; Council of the European Union, 
‘Council Conclusions on the Central African Republic’ 20 January 2014. 
4 The Multinational Force that occupied Iraq starting in 2003 began as a state-led CME lacking UN authorization, 
but was subsequently authorized. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 7 July 2011, European Court of Human Rights, no. 
27021/08, paras. 17-19, 26-35. 
5 S.C. Res 1244 (S/RES/1244) 10 June 1999. 
6 The presence of peacekeepers, for example, can reduce the risks of renewed conflict, conflict spillover, and 
atrocity. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘International peacebuilding,’ (2000) American Politcal Science 
Review pp. 779-801; Kyle Beardsley, ‘Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict,’ (2011) 73 Journal of 
Politics 1051-1064 (2011); Erik Melander, ‘Selected To Go Where Murderers Lurk?’m (2009) 26 Conflict 
Management and Peace Science pp. 389-406; Virginia Page Fortna, ‘Does peacekeeping keep peace?’, (2004) 48 
International Studies Quarterly pp. 269-292.  
7 Oona A. Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, ‘Outcasting,’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal 252-349; International Law 
Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1) (2001) [‘DARSIWA with 
Commentaries’] arts 40-41.  
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crudely: whose wrong is it when a CME violates international law?  
The question is difficult precisely because what distinguishes CMEs is that they are 
governed by merged and redistributed systems of authorization, strategic leadership, operational 
control, command, and discipline. Troop contributing states and one or more organizations or 
lead states each take on some fraction of the functions that would ordinarily be held by a single 
authority. For example, on France’s telling the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
responsible for the ‘direction’ of the UN-authorized force in Kosovo (KFOR) and the UN was 
responsible for ‘control’ of it, while troop contributors retained disciplinary authority, criminal 
jurisdiction, troop appointment and promotion authority, and training responsibilities..8 The 
allocation of these functions varies considerably across ventures (and even within the same 
venture over time). Sometimes even a single function is shared by two or more parties, as 
exemplified by the UN-NATO ‘dual-key’ system in Bosnia.9 
CMEs are hardly the only form of shared conduct challenging the model of independent 
responsibility.10 However, they are particularly prominent in the emergent jurisprudence. First, 
CMEs are the most common ventures in which states and international organizations merge 
systems of decision-making and action.11 Second, courts have become increasingly receptive to 
litigation on military operations, rejecting the notion that international humanitarian law (IHL) 
simply displaces (the more commonly justiciable) international human rights law (IHRL) in 
times of war, and recognizing a growing sphere of state human rights duties abroad.12 Third, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Legality of the Use of Force (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. France), 15 December 2004, International Court 
of Justice, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 575, para. 46. 
9 S.C. Res. 836 (S/RES/836) 4 June 1993, para. 10. 
10 André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law,’ (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of 
International Law pp. 359-438; Tom Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power and Preventive Responsibility’, in André 
Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Distribution of Responsibilities in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) pp. xx-xx. 
11 Ibid., p.xx. Similar issues arise in collective border enforcement and transnational policing but CMEs are the most 
common of such ventures. 
12 Dealing with IHL through the lens of IHRL (in various ways), see, for example, Hassan v. United Kingdom, 16 
September 2014, European Court of Human Rights, no. 29750/09, paras. 99-107; Mohamed v. Secretary of State for 
Defence, [2015] EWCA Civ 843, paras. 105-106, 164-253; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 
July 1996, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 226, p.240; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 136, p.178; Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 25 November 2000, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(ser. C) No. 70, p.79. The issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been especially fraught at the European Court of 
Human Rights. Setting a notoriously high threshold, see Banković v. Belgium and others, 12 December 2001, 
European Court of Human Rights, no. 52207/99, paras. 54-82. Lowering that threshold, see, inter alia, Al-Skeini and 
others v. United Kingdom, 7 July 2011, European Court of Human Rights, no. 55721/07, paras. 132-150; Hassan 
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given the inherently threatening nature of military action to human rights and ongoing 
uncertainty regarding the interaction between IHL and IHRL, CMEs inevitably generate 
numerous plausible legal claims.13  
This article considers the jurisprudence that has emerged as a result of these factors. Part B 
examines the International Law Commission’s (ILC) thin framework of CME responsibility. Part 
C evaluates the case law on CME attribution and its recent trajectory. Part D identifies key 
features of where the law stands today and poses questions regarding the future of the doctrine in 
this domain. 
B. The ILC Framework 
The ILC’s work on attribution was articulated in its final form in several provisions of the 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DARSIWA) (2001) 
and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations  (DARIO) (2011).14 
Neither draft code looks set for translation into a binding treaty, but both have the potential to 
provide the focal points around which custom can develop, and at least some provisions were 
rooted in pre-existing custom.  
Under both codes, all official acts and omissions of state or organization organs or agents 
are attributable to the state or organization, even if that conduct is ultra vires.15 Cooperation 
between organs or agents—as occurs in the context of detainee transfers—does not alter that 
foundational attributive link.16 One state or organization might be held responsible for its organ 
having assisted the wrongful conduct of another state in such a scenario, but it would be 
attributed only with the assistance, not with the primary wrong.17 This simple model breaks 
down when the provision of troops, authorization of the venture, and participation in its strategic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
supra note 12, paras. 75-78; Jaloud v. Netherlands, 20 November 2014, European Court of Human Rights, no.  
47708/08, paras 143-153. 
13 This is most obviously the case for rights associated with detention and killing. 
14 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations,’ Report on 
the Work of its Sixty-Third session, (GAOR 66th Session, sup. No. 10) (A/66/10) (2011) [“DARIO with 
Commentaries”]; DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7. 
15 DARIO with Commentaries supra note 14, arts 6, 8; DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, arts 4, 7. 
16 This reflects a deep presumption of independent (and not shared) responsibility. See: DARSIWA with 
Commentaries, supra note 7, p.64; Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra note 10. On detainee transfer: Soering v. United 
Kingdom, 7 July 1981, European Court of Human Rights, no. 14038/88; Alzery v. Sweden, 10 November 2006 
Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005. 
17 See sources cited supra note 16; DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, art. 14; DARSIWA with 
Commentaries, supra note 7, p.16. 
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or operational leadership is distributed among a number of states or organizations. Isolating 
which conduct is whose in that scenario requires a special rule. 
1. CMEs led by International Organizations 
The provision most commonly invoked to perform that role is DARIO article 7, which 
provides that the conduct of state (or international organization) organs placed “at the disposal” 
of an international organization is to be attributed to the latter if it exercises “effective control” 
over the conduct.18 This provision can be interpreted in at least two ways. The first presumes a 
default attribution that is rebutted when the lead organization controls the conduct; the second 
presumes no default attribution, but examines each enterprise participant’s control over the 
impugned conduct. 
The former has obvious textual appeal. Read in isolation from its Commentary or purpose, 
DARIO article 7 appears to presume a default attribution to the troop contributor (pursuant to 
DARSIWA article 4 or DARIO article 6) up to the point that the recipient organization controls 
the impugned conduct.19 Transposing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) interpretation of 
‘effective control’ from the context of attributing non-state actor conduct to states, that would 
mean attribution to the troop contributor unless the recipient “directed or enforced the 
perpetration of [the wrongful] acts.”20  
This would either preclude dual attribution, on the assumption that the recipient’s effective 
control would displace the ordinary attributive links recognized in DARSIWA article 4 and 
DARIO article 6, or it would provide for dual attribution whenever the recipient organization 
exercises effective control, on the assumption that the ordinary attributive links would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, art. 7. 
19 The Dutch Procurator General and the ECtHR have hinted at this interpretation, but each equivocated by 
emphasizing the contributor’s control. André Nollkaemper, ‘Procurator General of the Dutch Supreme Court 
Concludes to Reject Appeal against Srebrenica Judgment,’ SHARES Blog (3 May 2013); Al-Jedda, supra note 4, 
paras. 80-86. See also Kristen E. Boon, ‘Are Control Tests Fit for the Future?,’ (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 15, pp.1-48, p.24. 
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 27 June 1986, International 
Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 14, para. 115; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), 26 February, 2007, International Court of 
Justice, I.C.J. Reports 43, paras. 397-401; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 19 
December 2005, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 168, paras. 146-147. Translating something like this to 
CMEs, see Marko Milanovic and Tatjana Papic, ‘As Bad as it Gets,’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly pp. 267-296, p. 282. 
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unaffected by that control.21 Neither of these radically opposing implications is plausible.  
The ILC Commentary and the emerging case law militate instead in favor of applying the 
effective control analysis not just to the recipient organization, but also to the troop contributor.22 
Rather than starting with a default attribution, this demands a bifocal, conduct-specific analysis 
all the way down. When the recipient international organization exercises exclusive effective 
control over the conduct, the conduct is attributed exclusively to that organization. When the 
sending state or international organization exercises exclusive effective control, the conduct is 
attributed exclusively to that entity, pursuant to DARSIWA article 4 or DARIO article 6, read in 
conjunction with the text of and commentary to DARIO article 7.23 However, attribution to one 
party does not preclude attribution to another, and when two parties exercise effective control 
over the conduct, dual attribution is appropriate.24 The key question for dual attribution, then, is 
how broadly to interpret “effective control.” 
The Commentary states explicitly that ‘effective control’ in this context plays a “different 
role” from ‘effective control’ in the ICJ jurisprudence on attributing non-state actor conduct to 
states.25  In a CME, the question is to which of the participating states or IOs the conduct is to be 
attributed, whereas in the non-state actor context, the question is whether the conduct is to be 
attributed to the state at all. 26 Nonetheless, ‘effective control’ has an “essential ambiguity” that 
can only be resolved as the standard is applied in practice.27 Before turning to courts’ efforts in 
that regard, it is worth considering briefly the ILC’s approach to state-led CMEs. 
2. CMEs led by States 
Normatively, there is no reason why attribution should differ when a CME is headed by a 
state, rather than an international organization. However, in the case of organs “placed at the 
disposal” of a state, DARSIWA article 6 attributes conduct to that state when the seconded organ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, ‘The U.N. Is Bound By Human Rights,’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal Online 
pp.1-12, p.8. 
22 Tom Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct,’ 
(2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly pp.713-728, pp. 720-1. 
23 DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, p.87. 
24 On the first point, see ibid. p.81. 
25 DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, p.86. 
26 Id. 
27 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) p. 205 
fn.216 
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exercises “elements of the [recipient’s] governmental authority.”28 In theory, “governmental 
authority” could be exercised with no recipient control over the impugned conduct; conversely, a 
high level of recipient control over conduct is compatible with a lack of governmental 
authority.29  
Despite its different trigger criterion, DARSIWA article 6 offers two lines of interpretation 
parallel to those applicable to DARIO article 7. On a plain text reading, an organ’s conduct 
seems to be that of the sending state until it exercises the governmental authority of the recipient, 
at which point attribution switches to the latter. The Commentary, on the other hand, asks 
whether the organ “remain[s] under the authority of the sending state,” “under the authority” of 
the receiving state, or, alternatively, whether it is “a joint organ of several States,” or acts on 
their “joint instructions.”30  At the crux of the matter, it continues, “is the establishment of a 
functional link” between the organ and “the structure of authority” of the relevant state.31 
The latter test shares key features with the Commentary-inspired, bifocal interpretation of 
DARIO article 7’s effective control test. Both reject a presumptive institutional line of attribution 
for enterprise conduct, starting instead from the premise that two or more CME participants (at 
least the contributor and the recipient) have a formal institutional link to each CME troop 
contingent, and holding that the attributive significance of that formal link is contingent on the 
distribution of levers of conduct-relevant control (DARIO article 7) or authority (DARSIWA 
article 6) among the formally linked participants.32 This still leaves the different DARIO and 
DARSIWA trigger criteria, but that might be narrowed by interpreting “functional link” to mean 
any link relevant to the state’s capacity to control the impugned conduct.  
Alternatively, a similar harmonization of standards may be feasible through the application 
of DARSIWA article 8, which attributes conduct when performed “on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of” the relevant state.33 The language of article 8 is deliberately 
flexible. According to the Commentary, “it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, art 6. 
29 The indicator that the organ is indeed at the “disposal” of the recipient is that the organ must generally be subject 
to the recipient’s direction, rather than subject to its home state’s instruction, but this is seemingly a test of 
institutional structure, not specific conduct. DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, p.44; ibid p.44, fn.130.  
30 DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, p.44. 
31 Id. 
32 Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power,’ supra note 10, p. XX. 
33 DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, art. 8. 
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particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that 
the conduct controlled should be attributed to it.”34  This flexibility allows an interpretation of 
DARSIWA article 8 that would mimic DARIO article 7 in CME scenarios, while maintaining a 
higher DARSIWA article 8 control test for the attribution of non-state actor conduct.35 
Whether or not article 6, article 8, or some combination is the proper frame for a state-led 
CME is open to debate.36 The key point here is that they are both textually divergent from the 
DARIO model, and yet both sufficiently flexible to overcome that divergence, thereby achieving 
a harmonization that would have the virtue of realizing normative coherence across the draft 
codes.  
C. An Emergent Case Law Lacking Normative Unity 
DARSIWA and DARIO flexibility here reflects the minimal prior practice on the issue of 
dual attribution in shared military ventures. A consequence is that much doctrinal work has been 
pushed downstream to state practice and adjudication. This Part explores the latter, looking first 
at various early forms of hostility to dual attribution, then examining the ways in which courts 
have opened to the idea, and finally identifying enduring uncertainties.  
1. An Early Problem 
One of the earliest relevant cases predates both ILC codes. At its core was a claim against 
the UK before the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) regarding Rudolf Heß’s 
detention in Berlin-Spandau prison.37 The prison had been established by the Allied 
Kommandatura (the governing body for post-World War II Berlin) to house Nazi war criminals, 
and was administered by the UK, the US, the USSR, and France under a system of overall 
unanimity, with operations performed by representatives of one state at a time on a three-month 
rotation. Only the UK was subject to the ECmHR’s jurisdiction. In declining to consider the 
merits, the Commission explained that responsibility for the detention was “exercised on a Four 
Power basis” with the UK only “a partner in the joint responsibility which it shares with the three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id. p.48. See also Boon, supra note 19, p.18. 
35 Cf. Ibid.  p.26; Aurel Sari, ‘Untangling Extra-territorial Jurisdiction from International Responsibility in Jaloud v. 
Netherlands,’ (2014) 53 Military Law and Law of War Review pp.287-318, Part V.2. 
36  A key issue is whether CME military operations abroad ever count as exercises of “governmental authority” (per 
article 6). The Commentary gives no guidance on this, except to say that “mutual defense” arrangements do not 
count. DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, p.44. 
37 Hess v. United Kingdom, 28 May 1975, European Commission of Human Rights, no. 6231/73. 
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other Powers.”38  
The holding can be read in one of two ways. First, the Commission’s premise may have 
been that attribution to the UK would have entailed attribution to the other three states as 
indispensable third parties on whose obligations it lacked the authority to rule.39 This highlights 
the potential of dual attribution to pose an obstacle to litigation, given the frequency with which 
no court or interpretive authority would have jurisdiction over all relevant participants. As 
discussed in Part D, recent jurisprudence has moved in the opposite direction, with dual 
attribution a litigation enabler. 
If the first interpretation of Hess spotlights the way that dual attribution might obstruct 
accountability, the second is hostile to the very idea of dual attribution. On this interpretation, the 
ECmHR meant that only the Kommandatura itself, and not its state participants, could be 
attributed with official prison conduct. Hinting at this, the Commission observed, “joint authority 
cannot be divided into four separate jurisdictions.”40 The implications of such a rule are even 
more severe. It would allow states or international organizations to create CMEs that are 
themselves not subject to international law or to the jurisdiction of any court, and yet that are the 
only entities attributed with enterprise conduct.  
Whichever way one interprets Hess, its implications for CME accountability are not 
promising. Either multiple attribution to enterprise participants blocks accountability, or 
attribution to CME participants ought to be rejected altogether. As discussed below, each of 
these has been discarded over time. The second in particular would be in significant tension with 
the DARSIWA and DARIO, which hold that joint organs are to be attributed to all relevant states 
and organizations, and that states may not use international organizations to circumvent their 
obligations.41  
2. Early Hostility to Dual Attribution 
Nonetheless, initially at least, the drafting of the DARIO and DARSIWA did not trigger a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. 
39 Cf. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States of America), 
15 June 1954, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 19, pp. 32-33; Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia), 30 June 1995, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 90, para 28. But see Certain Phosphate Lands 
in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 26 June 1992, International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 
240, para. 55. 
40 Hess, supra note 37. 
41 DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, pp. 87-88, 110, art. 61. 
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judicial opening to dual attribution. Moreover, the single attribution that the courts favored at 
that stage—presumptive attribution to the lead organization—proved an obstacle to 
accountability due to courts’ lack of jurisdiction over international organizations. 
The landmark judgment in this respect was the 2007 European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) ruling in Behrami, which denied claims against states involved in the UN-authorized 
NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR).42 Despite referencing what would become DARIO article 7 and 
finding that NATO held “effective command of the relevant operational matters,” the Court 
attributed KFOR acts and omissions exclusively to the UN because it had “ultimate authority and 
control” over the force in light of the facts that the Security Council authorized the force, 
delegated operational control to NATO within broad limits, and received regular reports from the 
field.43  
Attribution of the conduct to the UN on these grounds disposed of any question of 
attribution to the troop contributors, implying that dual attribution would obtain on this model 
only if a group of states stood collectively in the position of the UN vis-à-vis KFOR.44 
Attribution would have been shifted to a troop contributing state only if that state were to have 
intervened disruptively to nullify NATO control and UN ultimate authority.45 In the absence of 
any court with jurisdiction over the UN, the accountability deficit was conspicuous.46  
As explained below, Behrami diverged radically from both of the alternative DARIO 
interpretations discussed in Part B. Nonetheless, it endured in the short term, and continues to 
influence attribution decisions today.47 
A year after Behrami, the District Court in The Hague advanced an alternative test in H.N. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, 2 May 2007, European Court of Human 
Rights, nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01.  
43 Ibid. paras. 132-41.  
44 Yugoslavia argued that the North Atlantic Council waged the 1999 war against it “as a joint enterprise,” such that 
all member states were “attributable jointly and severally” with the command structure that they had created,. 
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom) (Oral Proceedings) [Public Sitting 12 May 
1999] Transcript, CR 1999/25, 16.  
45 Behrami, supra note 42, paras. 138-139. 
46 Cf. Tom Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability,’ 
(2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal pp.113-192, pp. 121-129. 
47 Following Behrami: Kasumaj v. Greece, 5 July 2007 European Court of Human Rights, no. 6974/05; Gajić v. 
Germany, 28 August 2007, European Court of Human Rights, no. 31446/02. On its impact recently, see Part C.4 
infra. 
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v. Netherlands. 48 Its crux was the transfer by the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) of the UN 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the claimants’ family members from the 
battalion’s Potočari compound to the Bosnian Serb Army during the latter’s genocide at 
Srebrenica. The Court attributed the transfer to the UN due to its ‘operational command and 
control’ over the enterprise, holding that the Netherlands would have been attributed only if it 
had ‘cut across’ the UN chain of command by directing Dutchbat ‘to ignore’ or ‘go against’ UN 
orders.49  Even ‘parallel instructions’ would not have warranted attribution to the Netherlands.50 
Although reversed on appeal, H.N. articulates the standard claimed by the UN and troop 
contributors in most peacekeeping missions.51  
Both H.N. and Behrami depart from the DARIO framework (on either interpretation of the 
latter). The textualist interpretation of DARIO article 7, like both judgments, is built on a 
presumption that all enterprise conduct will be attributed to a specific actor. However, while the 
DARIO presumption attributes all conduct to the contributor state (unless the lead organization 
directs the conduct), Behrami and H.N. adopt the diametrically opposed position, attributing all 
conduct to the lead organization (unless a contributor overrides its command and directs the 
conduct). By eschewing either enterprise-level presumption in favor of a conduct-specific control 
analysis, the bifocal interpretation of DARIO article 7 conflicts even more fundamentally with 
both judgments.52  
The most plausible reconciliation between H.N. or Behrami and the DARIO would be to 
define the CME in each case as an organ of the UN, covered by DARIO article 6, with the 
contributor state imputed with conduct only when it usurps control, per DARSIWA article 8.53 
However, neither court suggested that it viewed things in that light. Moreover, if state troop 
contingents sent to act under UN operational control are not state organs “placed at the disposal” 
of an international organization, it is difficult to imagine what is covered by article 7. 
H.N. and Behrami differ on what counts as leading the enterprise in a way that underpins 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Rechtbank's-Gravenhage, HN v. Netherlands (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Judgment, 
LJN: BF0181/265615 (10 September 2008) (‘H.N. District Court Judgment’).  
49 H.N. District Court Judgment, supra note 48, para. 4.14.1.  
50 Ibid.  
51 DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, p.88; Secretary-General, ‘Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of 
the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,’ (A/51/389) 20 September 1996, paras. 7-8; 
Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, p.153.  
52 Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power,’ supra note 10, p.xx. 
53 On the CME as the organ of the recipient IO, see Sari and Wessel, supra note 2, p.132. 
	   12	  
the attributive presumption. Applied to the Behrami facts, the H.N. rule would have attributed 
KFOR’s actions to NATO, and not to the UN. But what they share is the basic premise that 
leadership of the enterprise (however defined) is presumptively attributive of all enterprise 
conduct, unless another entity distorts the normal workings of that system.54 Moreover, neither 
allows for dual attribution, unless the lead entity is itself a collective.  
If Behrami reflects a normative principle, it seems to be that the entity authorizing the 
CME should structure the enterprise so that it retains the levers of control necessary to ensure 
good conduct.55 However, this principle misunderstands the agreements that structure CMEs.56 
All states and organizations that participate in multinational enterprises cede some form of 
control to one another. Doing so is essential to effective international cooperation of this kind 
and is vital to the very enforcement of contemporary international law.57 The choice for 
participants (including the authorizing participant) is not between retaining total control and 
ceding control; it is between ceding control and forgoing collaboration. Given the value of such 
cooperation, as long as the enterprise is lawful and any instance of enterprise wrongdoing is 
attributable to at least one state or organization, attribution should reflect the agreement that was 
reached, not what might have been.  
3. Movement to Bifocal Conduct-Specific Analysis and Dual Attribution 
Behrami and H.N. were the high water marks for both enterprise-level presumptions and 
hostility to dual attribution. The ECtHR’s first steps away from both positions came in Al-Jedda 
v. UK, a 2011 case involving the detention of a terrorist suspect by UK forces operating as part 
of the UN-authorized Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq.58 The UK argued unsuccessfully that 
Behrami mandated attributing Al-Jedda’s detention to the UN because the Security Council 
maintained ultimate authority and supervised the force via periodic reporting. 59   
At first seeming to accept the UK’s doctrinal premise, the Court distinguished the case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. Aurel Sari, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO,’ (2012) 9 International Organizations Law 
Review pp.77-85, p.83; Sari and Wessel, supra note 2, p.141.  
55 See, e.g., Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1999) p.164. 
56 Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power,’ supra note 10, p.xx. 
57 Ibid. p.xx. 
58 Al-Jedda, supra note 4. 
59 Ibid. para. 64. 
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from Behrami on factual grounds.60 However, it then made two doctrinal shifts that seemed to 
render the factual distinctions redundant. First, it separated the question of whether MNF 
conduct was attributable to the UN from the question of whether it was attributable to the UK, 
raising the possibility (contra Behrami) that both questions could be answered in the affirmative, 
generating dual attribution. 61  
Second, the Court held that the UN had “neither effective control nor ultimate authority and 
control” over the detention, whereas the UK did exercise control over the detention, despite 
external committee review.62 Despite its unhelpful equivocation on the applicable rule and its 
failure to elaborate on what ‘effective control’ entails, the judgment inched towards the ILC rule 
and away from the notion that authorizing and periodically supervising the enterprise is 
sufficient for exclusive attribution with its conduct.63  
More impressive strides in that direction have been made in the Dutch courts. This began 
with the reversal of H.N. at the appellate level in Nuhanović v. Netherlands and has continued as 
the next round of litigation has built on that step forward.64  
Unlike the ECtHR, the Nuhanović Court of Appeal structured its entire ruling around 
DARIO article 7, identifying ‘effective control’ as the only applicable test.65 Equally 
significantly, the Court interpreted the ‘effective control’ test in the bifocal form introduced in 
Part B, determining attribution by “which of both parties has ‘effective control’ over the relevant 
conduct.”66 As I argued in an article cited by the Court as a source on effective control, this 
deviation from the article 7 text was both normatively well-directed and consistent with the 
ILC’s Commentary, which defines “the decisive question” as “who has effective control over the 
conduct in question” and roots any attribution to the contributing state in “the control that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid. paras. 77-83. 
61 Ibid. para. 80. 
62 Ibid. paras. 84-85. 
63 Cf. Munaf v. Geren, 533 US 1, 8 (2008) (reaching a similar conclusion regarding an analogous domestic law 
issue). 
64 Gerechtshof's-Gravenhage, Nuhanović v Netherlands, Appellate Judgment, LJN: BR 5388 (5 July 2011) 
[“Nuhanović Appellate Judgment”].  
65 Ibid. para. 5.8. 
66 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
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State possesses in the relevant respect.”67  
Adopting this bifocal approach has profound implications for the meaning of “effective 
control.” As the ILC notes correctly, ultra vires conduct should no more be left unattributed 
when it is performed by CMEs than it is in unilateral contexts.68 This rules out transposing the 
ICJ’s ‘effective control’ standard for attributing the conduct of non-state actors, because it will 
often be the case that no CME participant “directed or enforced the perpetration of [the 
wrongful] acts.”69 Appreciating this, the Court of Appeal instead defined the ‘effective control’ 
test to ask whether “the UN or the State had the power to prevent the conduct,” thereby 
incorporating my core proposal in the aforementioned article..70 Since multiple actors can hold 
preventive power, this move was intrinsically friendly to dual attribution, which the court 
affirmed explicitly. 71  
The explicit endorsement of a bifocal test, the preventive interpretation of “effective 
control,” and dual attribution were all major shifts from H.N. and Behrami. However, the Court’s 
application of the “power to prevent” focused on a contextual peculiarity, leaving the doctrine’s 
scope ambiguous. After Srebrenica fell, the Dutch government decided to withdraw Dutchbat 
and, with UN cooperation, began (unusually) to issue orders to the troops additional to those of 
UN command.72 The Court surmised that the Netherlands held preventive effective control, 
because if it were to have instructed “Dutchbat not to [evict the individuals from Potočari], such 
an instruction would have been executed.”73  
Ordinarily, failing to prohibit wrongful conduct is one way of failing to prevent it – it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, pp. 85, 87. See Nuhanović Appellate Judgment, supra note 64, para 
5.8; Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, p.141. For a more detailed analysis of the Commentary, see 
Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica,’ supra note 22, pp.721, 724-25.  
68 On the ultra vires acts of international organization organs and state organs, Part B. On the ultra vires acts of 
CMEs and the reason for attributing ultra vires conduct, see DARIO with Commentaries, supra note 14, pp. 85, 93 
69 The ICJ’s approach has returned repeated null results. Nicaragua, supra note 20, para. 116; Bosnian Genocide, 
supra note 20, paras. 413-5; Armed Activities, supra note 20, para. 160.  
70 Nuhanović Appellate Judgment, supra note 64, para 5.9 [emphasis added]. See DARIO with Commentaries, supra 
note 14, p.91 fn129; Crawford, supra note 27, p. 206; André Nollkaemper, ‘Dual attribution,’ (2011) 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice pp.1143-1157, p.1148. For my original articulation, see Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ 
supra note 46, p.157. Supporting the test more recently, see Noemi Gal-Or & Cedric Ryngaert, ‘From Theory to 
Practice,’ (2012) 13 German Law Journal pp.511-541, p. 529. 
71 Nuhanović Appellate Judgment, supra note 64, para 5.9. 
72 Ibid. paras. 5.10-5.12, 5.18. On the original UN structure, see ibid. para. 5.7. 
73 Ibid. para. 5.18, 5.20, 6.8, 6.20. 
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simply a passive form of authorization.74 However, this basis for attribution to the Netherlands 
was unfortunate on two levels. First, it obscured the preventive principle’s implications for more 
typical scenarios. Second, the Netherlands’ failure to prohibit was not a passive form of 
authorization in this case. UN command, which retained simultaneous operational control, had 
ordered Dutchbat to “[t]ake all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in your 
care” – an order that (according to the Court) Dutchbat contravened when it evicted the 
claimants’ relatives.75 In other words, the problem was not that the battalion did not receive a 
legally binding order to refrain from the wrongful conduct; it was that it disobeyed precisely such 
an order.  
This is crucial. The power to prevent disobedient conduct is not held by those that could 
have given alternative orders. By its nature, such conduct denies the efficacy of orders as levers 
of control.76 Effective control in that context is held instead by the state(s) or international 
organization(s) that have the power to generate lawful decision-making and obedience to orders. 
Like most contributor states in peacekeeping missions, the Netherlands exercised that form of 
control over Dutchbat in the form of its criminal jurisdiction and its authority to select and train 
the troops, to structure the battalion hierarchy, and to discipline or dismiss those that breached 
orders. That was sufficient to attribute the wrongs to the Netherlands, quite apart from its 
operational role.77 Of course, different Dutch orders may have been more effective than the UN 
order in preventing the eviction, but if that was so, it was surely because the Netherlands held the 
obedience-generating levers of control, not because it, just like the UN, was in a position to issue 
orders. 
Properly understood, the bifocal, preventive interpretation of ‘effective control’ inquires of 
each enterprise participant whether that participant held a sufficient concentration of the levers of 
control most relevant to preventing the wrongful conduct in question.78 As the discussion above 
indicates, those levers include far more than just the authority to direct. Which of them 
underpin(s) attribution depends on the conduct. 
Despite relying on the Netherlands’ power to have issued alternative orders, the Court did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, pp.165-170. 
75 Nuhanović Appellate Judgment, supra note 64, paras. 2.16, 6.8. 
76 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, p.160. 
77 Ibid. p.164. Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power,’ supra note 10. 
78 Ibid. pp.xx-xx. 
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indicate some openness to this alternative framing. Abstractly, it linked the concept of effective 
control to responsibility for personnel matters, disciplinary authority, and criminal jurisdiction.79 
Concretely, it noted the attributive “importan[ce]” of Dutchbat’s violation of the UN order and 
the Netherlands’ disciplinary authority.80  
The Dutch Supreme Court upheld the Nuhanović judgment, endorsing without qualification 
the Court of Appeal’s attribution analysis and affirming explicitly the possibility of dual 
attribution.81 However, by failing to discuss the preventive aspect of effective control, it left the 
role and contours of that doctrine uncertain.82  
The District Court in The Hague has since begun to fill that gap. The Mothers of Srebrenica 
brought suit against the Netherlands and the UN in a case that covered the same events as 
Nuhanović, but a much broader range of those killed at Srebrenica.83 After delays associated with 
the separation, dismissal, and appeal of the case against the UN, the District Court only reached 
the merits of the claims against the Netherlands after Nuhanović had run its course.84 Accepting 
both the preventive interpretation of effective control and the concept of dual attribution, 
Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands built on the earlier case.85 
 The Court assessed preventive control by evaluating the particularities of the impugned 
conduct against the “powers the State still had” and the “powers it had transferred” among 
operational control, troop selection, control over personnel matters, disciplinary authority, 
criminal jurisdiction, and the authority to withdraw the battalion.86 Alive to the role of many of 
these levers of control in generating obedience, the Court concluded that when a battalion under 
exclusive UN operational control acts contrary to UN orders or authorization, that “action is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Nuhanović Appellate Judgment, supra note 64, para 5.10 
80 ibid para 5.18. See also Boon, supra note 19, pp.39-40. 
81 Netherlands v. Nuhanović, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands) 6 September 2013, paras. 3.11.2, 3.11.3, 3.12.2, 3.12.3. 
82 Its silence on preventive control might be considered dismissive. Boon, supra note 19, p.40. However, the 
Procurator General had rejected explicitly the preventive dimension of its effective control analysis, whereas the 
Supreme Court (although silent on prevention) endorsed the lower court’s decision without qualification or caveat. 
Nollkaemper, ‘Procurator General,’ supra note 19. 
83 Rechtbank's-Gravenhage, Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, Judgment, LJN: 8748 / C/09/295247 (17 July 
2014) paras. 4.3, 4.11. 
84 On the earlier litigation against the UN and against the Netherlands for upholding UN immunity, see Mothers of 
Srebrenica v. Netherlands and UN, Judgment, LJN: BW1999 (2012), upheld in Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. 
Netherlands, 11 June 2013, European Court of Human Rights, no. 65542/12, paras. 135-70. 
85 Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, supra note 83, paras. 4.33-4.34, 4.44-4.46.  
86 Ibid. paras. 4.36, 4.41, 4.46. Cf. Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, pp.158-164. 
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attributable to the State supplying the troops because the State [through those levers of control] 
has a say over the mechanisms underlying said ultra vires actions.”87  
On this basis, the Court attributed to the Netherlands all of the Dutchbat conduct that 
contravened the UN order to protect civilians within the battalion’s care.88 As I argued both 
before and after Nuhanović, this is the right application of the preventive interpretation.89 In 
Mothers of Srebrenica, it led the Court to find that the Netherlands violated its right to life 
obligations to 320 men evicted from Potočari.90  
In each of these respects, Mothers of Srebrenica built impressively on Nuhanović. There 
are, however, two dimensions of its analysis relevant to dual attribution that might be questioned. 
First, the Court left open the possibility that Dutchbat action in contravention of UN orders could 
also be attributed dually to the UN.91 This would be too expansive. Unless the entity with the 
authority to issue orders also holds key levers of control over obedience generation, it has no 
effective control over disobedient acts.92 Second, in evaluating Dutchbat’s alleged direction of 
approaching refugees into the surrounding woods (prior to the aforementioned UN order), the 
Court concluded implicitly that actions neither ordered nor banned by the UN were attributable 
only to the UN.93 This is too restrictive. Having failed to narrow the battalion’s discretion to 
lawful acts, the UN was attributable with resulting wrongs, but the Netherlands’ control over 
training, troop-selection, discipline, and contingent structure were also relevant to preventing the 
contingent from abusing its discretion.94 It is not only when troops act ultra vires that a troop 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, supra note 83, paras 4.57-4.58. 
88 Ibid. Para. 4.89. See also ibid. paras. 4.94-4.95, 4.98, 4.114-4.115. In line with Nuhanović, the Court repeated the 
theory of dual operational control during the transition period, [Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, supra note 83, 
paras 4.80, 4.87] but, in contrast to Nuhanović, the control-over-obedience theory was given equal prominence and 
equal impact.  
89 Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica,’ supra note 22, pp.726-727; Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, 
pp.158-164. This may be part of “the literature” to which the Court refers without citation. Mothers of Srebrenica v. 
Netherlands, supra note 83, para. 4.60. 
90 See id. paras 4.324-4.338. The remaining killings were not deemed to be the consequence of illegal Dutchbat 
conduct because Dutchbat lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction vis-à-vis refugees outside the compound (ibid. para. 
4.160-4.161), the battalion lacked reasonable alternatives (ibid. para. 4.192-4.198, 4.283, 4.290-4.291) or there was 
no established causal link between its wrongs and refugee deaths. Ibid. paras. 4.201, 4.276-4.278. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, pp.158-164; Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power,’ supra note 10, p.XX. 
93 Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, supra note 83, paras 4.104-4.111. 
94 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, pp.165-170; Dannenbaum, ‘Public Power,’ supra note 10, p.XX. Cf. 
Cedric Ryngaert, Srebrenica Continued, (2014) 61 Netherlands International Law Review pp.365-454, pp.367-368 
(arguing, correctly in my view, that these actions should have been attributed to the Netherlands, but questioning 
whether they could have been attributed to the UN). 
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contributor with these powers is attributable.95  
Despite these issues, the judgment is the most complete and impressive judicial elaboration 
of the preventive interpretation to date. If Behrami and H.N. set the high water mark for 
enterprise-level presumptions and hostility to dual attribution, Mothers of Srebrenica marks the 
zenith (so far) of the bifocal, conduct-specific approach and its openness to dual attribution. 
4. Jurisprudential Retrenchment? 
Indeed, two recent rulings—Jaloud v. Netherlands and Mohamed v. Secretary of 
Defence—may indicate that the progress in the Dutch Courts was anomalous and that Al-Jedda 
was rooted more in a factual peculiarity than in a genuine doctrinal departure from Behrami. 
Jaloud addressed the April, 2004 actions of the Dutch contingent in the force operating 
under the UN-authorized, US- and UK-led Coalition Public Authority (CPA) in Iraq.96  The case 
involved a lethal shooting at a military checkpoint, most likely by a Dutch lieutenant.97 The 
victim’s father claimed that the investigation into the killing violated ECHR article 2’s 
procedural requirements.98  
The Netherlands denied that it could be attributed with the contingent’s conduct, noting 
that the UK was the public authority in the area and that a UK commander exercised operational 
control over the contingent.99 The Netherlands also claimed that merely controlling a checkpoint 
approached by an individual does not trigger extraterritorial human rights obligations to that 
individual, because it does not amount to exercising full control over the individual, effective 
control over territory, or public powers ordinarily exercised by the host.100  
These two issues—attribution and extraterritorial jurisdiction—are distinct legal questions, 
and the ECtHR addressed them separately. However, in establishing that the Netherlands had 
Convention obligations at the checkpoint (a jurisdictional issue, correctly located in the 
jurisdiction section), the Court emphasized factors pertaining to Dutch control over the 
contingent (an attribution question). It noted that despite UK operational control, the Netherlands 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ibid. p.367. 
96 Jaloud, supra note 12. 
97 The lieutenant fired 28 times, but Iraqi Civil Defense Forces or other Dutch troops may have shot, too. Ibid. paras. 
10-16. 
98 Ibid. paras. 105-108. On the investigation and domestic process see paras. 17-48. 
99 Ibid. paras. 113-115. See also ibid. para. 57. 
100 Ibid. paras. 109-110, 112-114, 116-126. 
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retained the right to contribute to the formation of “essential policy,” the authority to narrow its 
troops’ rules of engagement, and “full command” over its troops (entailing the preventive levers 
of control identified in Mothers of Srebrenica).101 Whether dual attribution to the UK would 
have been appropriate was left unaddressed. 
The designated attribution section was notably less detailed. The Court asserted simply that 
the Dutch troops were not placed “at the disposal” of any foreign power or “under the exclusive 
direction or control” of another state.102 This is the language of DARSIWA article 6 and an 
isolated line of its Commentary, but the Court neglected to cite those sources directly or to 
connect the concepts to the facts.103 In this cursory section, the Court also observed that the 
“complaints derive from alleged acts and omissions of Netherlands military personnel and 
investigative and judicial authorities.”104  
Both the attribution analysis in the jurisdiction section and that in the designated attribution 
section warrant attention. Consider the formal attribution analysis first. The claim against the 
Netherlands was not that Jaloud’s was a wrongful killing, but that it was inadequately 
investigated.105 The Netherlands held exclusive responsibility for such investigations; its Dutch 
Royal Military Constabulary had “its own line of command” and was “directly answerable to the 
Minister of Defence.”106 In other words, the investigators were not part of the merged CME. As 
such, the investigative inadequacy (as opposed to the killing itself) was plainly attributable to the 
Netherlands.107 Although the Court is not explicit here, this explains its brevity and the 
prominence of the investigative and judicial authorities in the designated attribution section.  
The jurisdiction section is more interesting and provokes three questions. Given that the 
impugned conduct was the failure to investigate, why was it necessary to attribute the conduct of 
the troops involved in the shooting?108 Why was this analysis located in the jurisdiction section? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid. paras. 57, 100, 143, 146-149. 
102 Ibid. paras. 141. 
103 DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, pp. 43-44. Identifying applicable law earlier in the judgment, the 
Court referenced DARSIWA articles 2, 6 and 8. However, it never linked these provisions to the facts or to the 
substantive reasoning. Jaloud, supra note 12, paras. 95-98. 
104 Ibid. para. 155. 
105 Listing the deficiencies of the investigation, see ibid. paras. 227-228.  
106 Ibid. paras 60-61 
107 Cf. DARSIWA with Commentaries, supra note 7, art 2. 
108 The duty to investigate does not hinge on whether state agents performed the killing. Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 
1998, European Court of Human Rights, no. 23818/94, para. 82. 
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And, what are we to make of it substantively? The answer to the first two questions seems to lie 
in the following unstated premise: a CME contingent that assumes a certain form of control over 
potential claimants thereby triggers the extraterritorial ECHR obligations only of those states 
attributable with the conduct that established the organ’s jurisdictional link.109 Thus, if the troops 
at the checkpoint exercised sufficient authority and control vis-à-vis Jaloud to trigger human 
rights obligations towards him and his next of kin (a jurisdictional question), it matters to which 
state those troops’ conduct was attributable (an attribution question), because that determines 
which state had the extraterritorial duty to investigate his death.110 Whether or not this was the 
right approach to extraterritoriality is tangential here. The relevant point is that it identifies the 
examination of the Dutch connection to the troops at the checkpoint as a complete CME 
attribution analysis that ought to be evaluated as such.111 
That substantive evaluation is complicated by the Court’s failure to explain why “full 
command” determined the attribution of the conduct at the checkpoint. On one interpretation, the 
Court’s reference to Dutch full command stood alone as a sufficient basis for attribution to the 
Netherlands.112 If that is what the ECtHR meant, the case marked a jurisprudential retreat. 
Without some criterion of the relevance of full command to the occurrence of the impugned 
conduct, such a rule would discard conduct-specific analysis altogether on the troop contributor 
side.113   
This would repeat the normative error at the heart of H.N. and Behrami. The latter cases 
attributed conduct with reference to operational control and authorization, regardless of whether 
those powers were conduct relevant; Jaloud, on this reading, would attribute based on full 
command, equally regardless of its conduct relevance. If Behrami and H.N. over-attribute to the 
lead entity, this reading of Jaloud would over-attribute to contributor states.  
What this reading of Jaloud gets right about article 6 is that the levers of preventive control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Cf. Al-Skeini, supra note 12, paras. 149-150 (establishing the “jurisdictional links” necessary to trigger the 
investigative duties of the United Kingdom by showing that the deaths were “caused by the acts of British soldiers 
during the course of or contiguous to security operations” and “when British soldiers carried out a patrol in the 
vicinity of the applicant's home and joined in the fatal exchange of fire.”) 
110 Cf. Al-Skeini, supra note 12, paras. 97-100. 
111 Cf. Sari, supra note 35, Part III. 
112 Ibid., Part V.1 (noting an interpretation of Jaloud that would hold “that full command is a sufficient reason to 
attribute wrongful conduct to a State.”)  
113 Moreover, since states rarely cede full command, it would entail universal attribution of CME conduct to troop 
contributors. See e.g. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, (AAP-06) 2013, p.2-F-7; Sari, supra note 54, p.79. 
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that make up “full command” matter to whether it makes sense to speak of seconded organs 
acting on the recipient’s “authority.” What it gets wrong is to suggest that seconded organs only 
act on recipients’ authority when the latter holds the levers of full command. A better reflection 
of the complexity of authority and control here would develop DARSIWA article 6 in light of the 
DARIO article 7 approach, evaluating bifocally whether CME troops acted on the authority of 
the sending or the receiving state (or both), as determined by which of those entities had the 
levers of authority and control relevant to determining the troops’ conduct. 
Jaloud can in fact be read in that alternative way. The Dutch troops were not instructed by 
UK command to shoot in the conditions that led to Jaloud’s death; quite the contrary, the 
shooting arguably exceeded what the UK had authorized.114 Since the levers of control entailed 
by full command are clearly relevant to preventing conduct that violates orders or abuses 
discretion, the attribution of the shooting to the Netherlands was entirely appropriate on a 
preventive interpretation of effective control.115 Although relying on reasoning that is not explicit 
in the judgment, this alternative reading makes sense of Jaloud’s reliance on Dutch full 
command, without implying that it ought to guide attribution irrespective of its relevance to the 
impugned conduct. It would instantiate a bifocal, conduct-specific interpretation of DARSIWA 
article 6 or could be rooted in the DARIO article 7-inspired interpretation of DARSIWA article 8 
advocated in Part B. 
 A clearer step backwards was taken by the Court of Appeal in England and Wales in 
Mohammed v. Secretary of Defence, which involved the liberty claim of a suspected Taliban 
commander, detained without charge for 110 days by UK troops acting as part of the UN-
authorized and NATO-run International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).116 
The UK argued that Mohamed’s detention was attributable exclusively to the UN.117 It lost, but 
the Court accepted much of its argument. Repeating Al-Jedda’s equivocation (in the opposite 
direction), the Court found that the Security Council had both ‘effective control’ and “ultimate 
authority and control” over ISAF, because ISAF was created and authorized by the Security 
Council, with NATO exercising operational control pursuant to Security Council authority.118  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Jaloud, supra note 12, para. 59 
115 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating,’ supra note 46, pp.158-170. 
116 Mohamed, supra note 12. 
117 Ibid. para. 50. 
118 Ibid. para 65. 
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Consequently, the Court held, “the actions of ISAF are attributable to the United Nations.”119  
The dubious invocation of ‘effective control’ notwithstanding, it is difficult to interpret this 
as anything other than a revival of Behrami. Emphasizing the fact that ISAF was created by the 
Security Council authorization, rather than being authorized after having been deployed, the 
Court distinguished the facts of Al-Jedda on the same grounds that Al-Jedda had distinguished 
the facts of Behrami.120 The implication is that Al-Jedda rested on that factual distinction, not the 
putative doctrinal shift discussed above. 
The Court’s presumption, then, was that ISAF conduct was attributable to the UN. 
However, Behrami recognized the possibility of rebutting that presumption when another entity 
usurps control.121 The Court found that precisely that occurred in Afghanistan. NATO required 
authorization from ISAF Command for any detention longer than 96 hours.122 The UK, however, 
used a “national policy caveat” to allow for longer detention when authorized by the Ministry of 
Defence, relegating ISAF to the role of “liaison and coordination” in such cases.123 Although 
ISAF Command did not actively object to this, ISAF leaders were not invited by the UK to 
authorize the policy or its application, which the UK considered “sovereign business.”124 Under 
these extraordinary conditions, the Court attributed Mohammed’s detention exclusively to the 
UK.125  
After the progress of Al-Jedda and the Dutch cases, Mohammed’s reversion to Behrami’s 
lead organization presumption and Jaloud’s arguable shift to a troop contributor presumption 
suggest a deep ambivalence regarding the right approach to CME attribution. 
D. Themes in CME Attribution and Future Directions 
Despite that doctrinal ambiguity, two trajectories are worthy of note. First, conduct-specific 
attribution determinations are on the rise, even if (as in Mohamed) they occasionally involve 
rebutting a presumptive attributive link. Second, dual attribution has become a litigation enabler, 
rather than an obstacle. The progressive Mothers of Srebrenica frame remains the right way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Ibid. para 65. 
120 Ibid. para 65. Cf. Al-Jedda, supra note 4, paras. 80-84. 
121 Behrami, supra note 42, paras. 135-139. 
122 Mohamed, supra note 12, paras. 9, 51, 68. 
123 Ibid. para. 68. 
124 Ibid. para. 68. 
125 Ibid. paras. 69, 72. 
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forward, but there are open questions regarding the status of illegal cooperative enterprises, 
liability attribution, and the complicity of enterprise members not attributed with conduct. 
1. The Rise of Conduct Specificity 
Behrami and H.N. articulated presumptive schemes of attribution for CME conduct; in 
neither case were those presumptions rebutted. Since then, however, conduct-specific attribution 
has dominated. In the Dutch cases and, arguably, in Al-Jedda, the courts’ analyses were bifocally 
conduct-specific all the way down; the question was which entity controlled the conduct, not 
whether the control of one displaced the presumptive responsibility of the other.  
Although Mohammed returned to a scheme of presumptive attribution, that presumption 
was rebutted by the UK’s national policy caveat and conduct-specific control. Jaloud is unclear 
on this issue, but the reconstruction offered above would define even its analysis in conduct-
specific terms. As courts become more comfortable with the need to evaluate the specific links 
between CME participants and the impugned conduct in all cases, the core value of an enterprise 
presumption—its simplification of the analysis and clarification of the target of claims—
diminishes considerably. 
2. The Theoretical Possibility of Dual Attribution 
A second theme has been courts’ growing recognition of the theoretical possibility of dual 
attribution combined with their failure to actually attribute CME wrongs to more than one entity. 
This spotlights a peculiar role for the concept. If it were necessary to perform a complete 
attribution analysis in any particular case, a broader scheme of dual attribution could disempower 
courts by triggering jurisdictional obstacles and the indispensable third party doctrine.126 
However, an expanded dual attribution doctrine in a context in which the full attribution analysis 
need not be performed (but exists in theory), has empowered courts by playing a role that 
precludes its own elaboration in practice.127 Crucial in facilitating this has been the growing 
openness to dual attribution via different attributive links (or different levers of control), such 
that—in contrast to Hess—attribution to one state or organization implies nothing about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 On international courts, see supra n 39. On domestic courts, see Yoram Dinstein, ‘Par in Parem Non Habet 
Imperium,’ (1966) 1 Israeli Law Review pp. 407-420.   
127 When attribution to a third party not involved in the litigation has been considered, it has, thus far (perhaps not 
coincidentally), been rejected. Al-Jedda, supra note 4, paras 80-84. 
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attribution to the other(s).128  
This may not be an indefinite equilibrium. The ICJ has wavered on the application of its 
own indispensable third party doctrine and the ECtHR has grown increasingly comfortable with 
issuing judgments that have all but ruled on the illegality of US conduct in the CIA black site and 
extraordinary rendition program.129 That may portend a willingness to attribute CME conduct 
even in cases in which dual attribution to another state or organization is a necessary implication. 
3. The Path Forward 
How often and in what circumstances dual attribution will be applicable going forward will 
depend on the model of attribution that emerges from the existing case law. In my view, the 
bifocal, preventive interpretation of effective control ought to be the leading candidate. It is at 
the core of the Dutch cases, and consistent with Al-Jedda and Jaloud (on at least one 
interpretation). It is also compatible with the outcome, if not the reasoning, of Mohammed, since 
the UK directed the detention, the detention contravened NATO rules, and the UK controlled 
obedience generation. Moreover, it reflects the principles underpinning the DARIO.130 
Despite the textual distinctions between the DARIO and the DARSIWA, normative 
consistency militates in favor of harmonization around this norm. If this cannot be achieved 
through a progressive interpretation of DARSIWA articles 6 and 8, the broader jurisprudence 
developing around DARIO article 7 may provide the grounds for a universal custom applicable 
to both state- and organization-led CMEs.  
The preventive ‘effective control’ framework is desirable in its instantiation of the core 
principle that the assertion of public power entails preventive responsibility regarding global 
wrongs, and in its affirmation of the fundamental value of institutionally thick international 	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129 On the ICJ, see: Nauru, supra note 39, para. 55. On the ECtHR, see: El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, 13 December 2012, European Court of Human Rights, no. 39630/09, para 239; Al-Nashiri v. Poland, 
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130 The ILC termed this a ‘wide meaning’ of ‘effective control,’ without specifying whether it disagreed. DARIO 
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article 7. Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica,’ supra note 22, p. 721. 
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cooperation.131 Unlike frameworks that rely on enterprise presumptions, it does not impute 
conduct to states or organizations whose only way of avoiding that attribution would be to avoid 
participation in the enterprise, to refuse to compromise on the allocation of enterprise control, or 
to contravene command structures in the field.132 
Assuming the doctrine develops stably in that direction, a series of additional questions are 
likely to arise. First, should the attribution framework for CME wrongs depend on the lawfulness 
of the cooperative venture? On the one hand, neither the DARIO nor the DARSIWA suggests the 
possibility of divergent tests for lawful and illegal ventures, and no court has considered the idea. 
On the other hand, if it is correct that the preventive control structure is underpinned normatively 
by the importance of lawful cooperation, it seems reasonable to ask whether that approach 
should extend to illegal ventures, or whether the latter should trigger a broader attribution 
doctrine, analogous to joint criminal enterprise. Second, as dual attribution becomes more 
common, a clear and explicit framework for apportioning liability will become essential.133 
Finally, vicarious responsibility warrants greater attention. What forms of responsibility vis-à-vis 
wrongful enterprise conduct attach to CME participants not attributed with the wrong?  
E. Conclusion 
The rapidly expanding jurisprudence on cooperative military ventures has yet to coalesce 
around a single normative framework. The role of the DARIO and DARSIWA in that realm has 
been decidedly mixed, perhaps predictably given the inconsistency between the two codes. The 
most hopeful developments have come in the Netherlands, with the elaboration of a bifocal, 
preventive interpretation of DARIO article 7. However, whether that framework will resonate 
elsewhere is uncertain.  
In all of this, the concept of dual attribution has played an odd role. It has been affirmed 
repeatedly in theory, but the primary value of its theoretical possibility has been in empowering 
courts to hear cases they might otherwise have avoided, while failing actually to attribute 
conduct to two or more entities. If courts were to start to apply dual attribution, new questions 
would arise. What would such a finding mean for the allocation of reparative responsibilities? 	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132 Id. pp. xx-xx. 
133 On the right to reparation, see Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) 
pp. 79-80. 
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How would sharing public responsibility affect the domestic political impact of such a ruling? 
Ought both states and international organizations submit to a single in-theater process, such as an 
expanded version of the never-delivered UN standing claims commission?134 
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